India became a nuclear-armed nation only for the limited purpose of self-defense, which was the core of India's NFU policy.
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India adopted the principle of no-use (NFU) in 2003. However, from the beginning, this theoretical role has been the subject of controversy. Some experts say that India's theoretical position means that India will use nuclear weapons in response to an attack. That is to say, India will play the role of watchdog until we are attacked by a nuclear attack, which shows India's tolerance and political idealism. At the international level, India's ideological role is understood to be one of reconciliation.
But the truth cannot go far from the facts. Experts studying global nuclear policy, through their decades-long continuous study, have come to realize that global nuclear policy has a perimeter of its own, influencing India's nuclear theory. That is why India's NFU policy is not based on tolerance or idealism, but on a deeper fact. The use of nuclear weapons is a key issue in the policy of any nuclear-armed nation, including India.
As the original policy makers of nuclear policy began to move away from the scope of this policy for any other reason, it seemed to be a mere bureaucratic exercise. This is insufficient from the point of view of the idealistic challenges to policy. Therefore, it is time to reconsider the expectations behind the original purpose of the NFU.
It goes without saying that current or past policymakers have never reconsidered the expectations behind the NFU's original intentions. However, these expectations have become a cornerstone of India's nuclear theory. If there is a real threat to India's NFU policy, it is to those who wear the veil of idealism. This confusion will not go away if we understand the thoughts behind it.
India became a nuclear-armed nation only for the limited purpose of self-defense, which was the core of India's NFU policy. The threat of a nuclear attack on the very existence of the country, that reason was enough for that. Nuclear weapons can cause maximum destruction in a short period of time. If a nuclear weapon were to strike a territory in the morning, it would be permanently wiped off the surface by noon.
If this is to be prevented, there is only one solution, and that is to threaten the country in front of a nuclear-armed country in the same way! Therefore, the fear of nuclear attack remains the same and the two nations tend to refrain from using nuclear weapons.
The threat of a nuclear attack is the only option left. Because no country has a mechanism that can defend itself against a nuclear attack. Experts believe that nuclear weapons should be used in a limited and prudent way, rather than carrying nuclear weapons, in order to sustain the nation. But Indian nuclear experts have always been skeptical about the feasibility of such nuclear weapons, and to some extent they do.
That is why the countries that suggest such limited use of nuclear weapons to the world, especially Russia and the United States, which are Cold War veterans, have the opportunity to break with the staunch supporters of India's nuclear program. Because Russia and the United States have always felt that India should not have a well-equipped, strong nuclear weapon like ours.
The important point is that it is not feasible to use nuclear weapons first, so you do not want to use these destructive weapons first. There are also some additional benefits to the NFU policy. For example, if there is sufficient consensus on political supremacy over nuclear weapons, the risk of using nuclear weapons is automatically reduced in that area.
The first use, which is against the NFU, is also inconsistent with the policy of 'nuclear resistance to nuclear weapons'. If one nation is not at risk of a nuclear attack from another, neither nuclear resistance can be the goal. However, Pakistan and Israel see their existence as a threat to their existence without nuclear weapons. Given Israel's geographical location, its size, its bitter struggle with its neighbors to survive, and the history of the Jewish people, it is dangerous to live without nuclear weapons. Because Israel has a mentality that we have to fight for our survival.
Similarly, Pakistan has fears about India. India still has not forgotten the wounds of partition, so Pakistan fears that India will avenge it one day or another. There is a huge difference in the traditional military strength between India and Pakistan. So Pakistan is under constant tension. In the war with India in December 1971, Pakistan became aware of India's military might and decided to develop nuclear weapons for self-defense. The principle of first use of nuclear weapons applies to both Israel and Pakistan because of their high risk of 'living without nuclear weapons'.
Of course, their approach is based on misunderstandings. But it is the duty of every country to protect itself, its country, its citizens from foreign aggression, and the defense policy of any country is based on the realization of the threat we face.
Among other nuclear-armed nations, only the United States and Russia strictly adhered to the rule of non-use of nuclear weapons, even during the Cold War. Both the superpowers remained under the threat of a sudden attack and the two countries had held nuclear weapons against each other at strategic locations, assuming that it would lead to a nuclear attack at any moment. In addition, the United States had accepted flexibility in its first use of nuclear weapons, pledging to be ready to defend its allies in the event of an attack by Russia or China. However, India's theory of nuclear use does not have such a framework. There is no threat to India's existence, no threat of a sudden attack, and no one has promised that India will protect its allies from attacks from other countries.
The former defense minister argues that India does not need to understand that it has adopted the NFU policy with the intention of imposing sanctions on itself. It is a common misconception that the NFU limits India's options. India's nuclear options are indeed very limited, but not because of the NFU, but because of the nature of nuclear weapons and India's need. If India really does not have restrictions due to NFU policy, then it needs to consider what kind of nuclear options are available to India.
India would have the freedom to use nuclear weapons first if the NFU was dismantled, but what would be the situation that would force India to use nuclear weapons first? It is clear that India's first use of nuclear weapons against a second nuclear-armed nation would be India's action to counter it. No one can stop this kind of action.
That is why responding to the enemy is considered a military dream. Some former Indian officials are serious about this. The response was to destroy the enemy's nuclear arsenal directly without attacking the enemy's cities or other places - arguing that if the enemy's nuclear arsenal was destroyed, it would not be possible for it to launch a nuclear attack on India. But intelligence needs to be precise for resistance. If the intelligence system knows where the enemy's nuclear weapons are hidden, it will be easier to target them.
Even the superpowers do not have such confidential information. Even if India tries to find and locate the nuclear weapons hidden by the enemy and save some of them, India will have to pay a heavy price.
It is okay to attack in response to an initial nuclear attack, if the nuclear war continues, it will cause minimal damage, it is advisable to launch such attacks on the enemy for this purpose, as it can prevent further genocide. But in such a case, NFU is the means of response, not an alternative. Uncertainty such as confidential information and the misleading serious consequences to its pair create the problem that, even in the event of a warning attack or response to an attack, the NFU's options are cut short. In addition, India and Pakistan (both India and China) will have very little time to respond to a war or war-like situation, so no political leader can order a nuclear attack on the mere suspicion that the enemy is ready to launch a nuclear attack.
The tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) policy adopted by Pakistan on purpose and its attitude towards fomenting terrorism have played a role of uneasiness in India towards Pakistan. The Indians can understand this uneasiness, so rejecting the NFU will bring at least some satisfaction. Terrorism and TNW are indicative of Pakistan's traditional military weakness. In response, threatening to use Indian nuclear weapons first would be impractical and could lead to a loss of credibility. Therefore, the only middle way for India is for India to maintain its control over its traditional military might and to control the hollow threat of Pakistan's nuclear attack by pointing out the reality of that country's leadership.
Considering both the rationale for India's NFU policy and the possibility of reversing it, it is doubtful that both proposals came from the point of view of idealism, and that this idealism is more capable of tackling such issues than handling India's strategic problems. . Doing so would be dangerous. This is because the NFU policy is apt to contain the situation in the Indian subcontinent, as its neighboring country is plagued by inferiority complex.
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