India should not put a brake on its Afghan policy and take advantage of the important strategic and security opportunities offered by Afghanistan.
 |
| Photo (https://unsplash.com/photos/9pQmjr9C_DY) |
The announcement of a visit to Kabul by a team of Foreign Ministry (MEA) officials to oversee delivery operations and to discuss India's humanitarian aid to Afghanistan with Taliban leaders should come as no surprise. For some time now, there has been talk that India is considering a way to reach the Taliban regime. It was also reported that a team of Indian officials had visited Kabul in February to look into the possibility of reopening the Indian embassy, albeit in small numbers and with very limited intentions. Although contacts between India and the Taliban began before the Taliban took control of Afghanistan, the first publicly acknowledged meeting between Indian officials and the Taliban took place in Doha two weeks after the Taliban took control of Kabul. Feelers were also regularly sent by the Taliban to restore ties with India. From Taliban spokesman Jabiullah Mujahid to Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaki and from Anas Haqqani to Sher Abbas Stanikzai, the Taliban have promised security if India opens its mission and has close cultural, economic and even security ties with India.
The decision by the Indian government to send 50,000 tonnes of wheat, medicine and vaccines to Afghanistan as humanitarian aid was the first big salute. Late last year, the government was instructed to send a delegation to monitor the distribution of aid and to seize the opportunity to contact the Taliban leadership in Kabul. The proposed visit will give the officers an idea of the land situation, which will be useful for deciding further action. Given that many other countries are sending delegations to Kabul, there is no reason for India to shy away from areas with significant security and strategic interests.
Although contacts between India and the Taliban began before the Taliban took control of Afghanistan, the first publicly acknowledged meeting between Indian officials and the Taliban took place in Doha two weeks after the Taliban took control of Kabul.
India seemed somewhat reluctant to seize the opportunity at that time. When Indian officials announced that India had recognized the reality of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan for the foreseeable future and
that it was adapting to it, it became clear that India had no interest in reviving any opposition to the emirate. Although India was not in the mood to move away from international consensus and recognize the emirate, it was not entirely against the possibility of engagement. Nonetheless, India remained in a wait-and-see position to see if Taliban 2.0 was an updated version of the original Taliban, to see to some extent the dynamics between the Taliban and Pakistan, and in part to see how it happened. Taliban terrorism, women, The rest of the world was reacting and responding to developments in Afghanistan, including the policies of minorities and political opponents. There must have been political and ideological opposition on the part of the Delhi government. Finally, the discrepancy between taking a tough stance against Islamic terrorist groups operating against India and at the same time trading with the Taliban was very clear. However, then diplomacy is often about holding your nose and dealing with people you hate.
that it was adapting to it, it became clear that India had no interest in reviving any opposition to the emirate. Although India was not in the mood to move away from international consensus and recognize the emirate, it was not entirely against the possibility of engagement. Nonetheless, India remained in a wait-and-see position to see if Taliban 2.0 was an updated version of the original Taliban, to see to some extent the dynamics between the Taliban and Pakistan, and in part to see how it happened. Taliban terrorism, women, The rest of the world was reacting and responding to developments in Afghanistan, including the policies of minorities and political opponents. There must have been political and ideological opposition on the part of the Delhi government. Finally, the discrepancy between taking a tough stance against Islamic terrorist groups operating against India and at the same time trading with the Taliban was very clear. However, then diplomacy is often about holding your nose and dealing with people you hate.
India has no illusions about what the Taliban are and what they represent. Also, India does not expect Taliban change. The idea that this is a changed Taliban from their experience in power during the nine months of the Taliban regime should appeal to anyone and everyone. At its heart, the Taliban is an ideologically driven movement, unable to change or evolve in any way. Simply put, if the Taliban changed, they would no longer be Taliban. Their ideological fanaticism means they will not sever ties with other terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, Jamaat Ansarullah and Jaish-e-Mohammed. Nonetheless, if India is looking at the possibility of having ties to the Taliban and perhaps considering having a presence in Kabul, it is to expand the menu of options.
If India is looking at the possibility of engaging with the Taliban and perhaps considering having a presence in Kabul, it is only to expand the menu of options.
Pakistan is still a decisive player
After taking control of the Taliban in August 2021, there was no shortage of devastation and gloom over how India had suffered a serious strategic setback and no role or say for the long term to come in Afghanistan. Even then, however, it was clear that it was only a matter of time before India returned to the game. The reason was simple: the world in the 2020s was very different from the 1990s when Pakistan was calling all the shots in Afghanistan. Pakistan is still a decisive player today, but its influence and control over the Taliban is not the same as it was a quarter of a century ago.
In the 1990s, Pakistan was not as broken as it is today. This means that in addition to security assistance, Pakistan is able to provide financial and financial assistance to the Taliban. Today, Pakistan is desperate to stay afloat and has no financial means to provide meaningful assistance to the Taliban. Politically, Pakistan was more involved in international affairs in the 1990s than it is today. Regardless of the rest of the world, the Taliban regime itself was able to gain full political recognition. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates used shares in the Middle East to recognize the Taliban. Today, Pakistan does not have the diplomatic space to identify itself and, therefore, is lobbying hard for other countries to recognize the emirate so that they can do the same. The Taliban are watching this very closely and are recognizing the limits of over-reliance on Pakistan. The TTP did not wreak havoc in Pakistan in the mid-1990s; Al Qaeda was a new organization; ISIS was nowhere on the horizon. Today, the TTP is a serious threat to Pakistan; Al Qaeda is also taking action; The local ISIS chapter - ISKP - is a major threat to both the Taliban and Pakistan. In other words, Pakistan's ability to influence the Taliban is limited by its own economic, political and security challenges.
Taliban 2.0
The Taliban have also changed - not ideologically but organizationally. The Taliban has tribal, regional, political and even policy-based (between pragmatic and radical) divisions that did not look like they did in the 1990s. So far, the quarrels between the different groups have shown no signs of escalating into conflict. However, this creates some space for India, especially some of these groups are not completely fascinated about Pakistan who treated many Taliban leaders extremely harshly, bullied them, imprisoned them and blackmailed them to comply. Developing relations with India benefits them to some extent on Pakistan. The way to play this fast game is that the more Pakistan dominates, the more Afghans will be attracted to India.
Pakistan does not have the diplomatic space to identify itself and so it is lobbying hard for other countries to recognize the emirate so that they can do the same.
However, the Taliban are smart enough to know that the India card only works to one point. Unlike India, which relies heavily on soft power, the Taliban understand that they need to use tough force to control Pakistan. Perhaps this is why the Haqqani network, which has Pakistan, has also set limits on what Pakistan can and can do. This is evident from the way the Taliban are handling the talks between the TTP and Pakistani officials. While the Taliban is helping the TTP-Pakistan talks, there is pressure on Pakistan to accommodate the TTP. Pakistan's problem is that if the talks succeed, it will mean giving way to the TTP; On the other hand, if the talks collapse, the TTP will go to war and add to the crisis of Pakistan's existence. And TTP alone is not used as an advantage.
The Taliban will not hesitate to use groups like the Baloch insurgents and even al-Qaeda against Pakistan.
Engage, separate or resist
Generally speaking, the options available to India are no different than those available to any other country. The American people have summed it up in three words: to engage, to separate, or to oppose. U.S. officials say they are focusing on the first two options and the third option is currently off the table. India has so far only focused on the isolation option. However, beyond one point, this option will offer a declining return, especially since many other countries are now beginning to ‘engage’ with the Taliban.
Although they may seem contradictory, most countries are pursuing a policy of engaging and isolating the Taliban. They are engaged in communicating, providing humanitarian and some financial assistance, resuming their mission, and forcing the Taliban to live up to some of their commitments on human rights, women's and minority rights, and providing a safe passage to the Afghan people. To leave At the same time, they are isolating the Taliban by withholding formal political recognition, providing aid and assistance to the government, and access to the international economic system.
They are engaged in communicating, providing humanitarian and some financial assistance, resuming their mission, and forcing the Taliban to live up to some of their commitments on human rights, women's and minority rights, and providing a safe passage to the Afghan people.
All three options should be included in Indian policy with some differences. While it is a case of India having links with the Taliban, India should at the same time reach out to its old friends, most of whom are refugees. As a country rooted for stability in Afghanistan and pushing for inclusive government, India can use its engagement with refugees to bring about reconciliation. The last thing India needs to do is make old friends and throw away old ones. As part of its participation, India can reopen not only its embassy but also its four consulates. It will be a kind of litmus test to see how independent the Taliban are from Pakistani influence. Participation will also mean providing some financial, development and humanitarian assistance.
Even if India engages the Taliban, it must at the same time isolate the Taliban and not sever ties with the rest of the international community. Although the Pakistanis are very worried about India's future with the official recognition of the Taliban before them, India should refrain from any such tactics. Among other things, such a move would open the door for Pakistan to formally recognize the Taliban. India should support the Taliban in isolation and under the pressure of international sanctions.
The last resort of India's approach is to oppose the Taliban, not only diplomatically and politically, but also to covertly support the anti-Taliban forces. After all, the Taliban are doing the same by befriending organizations like Jaish-e-Mohammed and Al-Qaeda. If anything, it could be India's carrot-stick with the Taliban. If left unchecked, other countries will also start supporting anti-Taliban forces, adding to India's diplomatic and strategic burden in Afghanistan. Of course, because of all this, India is ready to play hardball.
There is never a full stop in Afghanistan and therefore, there is no reason for India to put a full stop on the path of its policy in Afghanistan. Practicality with some stiff nose movements is not only a way to get back into the game but also guides its way as much as possible.
Post a Comment