The Agneepath scheme may seem feasible on paper, but in practice it may not look good from the context of employment and national security.
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A career in the military is not like any other thing, in some cases even sacrifice is required, which has more to do with intangible elements such as honor and dignity than financial compensation. Thus, it is short-sighted to make the Agneepath plan only to reduce the cost incurred by the Army. Considering its huge impact on India's social fabric and on the code of conduct and functioning of the Army, its consequences can be detrimental. Given our fragile security environment and China's aggressive designs, it may not be prudent to use such radical reforms. History may repeat itself when India was surprised in 1962 by the introduction of reforms by Nehru and Menon, which caused huge unrest between the General Staff and the Line Units during the Sino-Indian War.
Properly reconstructed agneepath plan can be considered in this context, otherwise, it may create more problems than claims to solve.
The need for change is hampered by the fact that the government has not issued a comprehensive national security policy document outlining the objectives and interests and the use of national power elements to achieve our desired goals. For the military, the NSS is the foundation of a comprehensive military doctrine that determines how the military must be organized, trained, and equipped to carry out its assigned tasks. Moreover, change cannot be alone; This cannot be done without considering the existing heritage system and considering the extent to which new ideas and technologies can be assimilated without affecting internal cohesion. The government has not been impressed by this argument and has started launching the scheme without testing.
The plan appears to have been hastily drawn up by a team with limited experience or an understanding of military ethics or procedures. The benefits expected of the government are simple hyperbole and whether those who are not selected will get jobs or not, as promised by the government and corporates, is a net guess. If there is any judge of history, there are vacancies in reserved seats for military veterans, PSUs, government, CAPF, etc.
Prior to that, it was based on the mathematically correct and transparent policy prevailing since 1966, to ensure that all States and Union Territories had fair representation in the military. It took into account factors like annual waste rate, RMP factor [1]. ] And intake pattern of previous years. Removing this along the centralized Pan-India quality list is likely to bring more benefits to those living in regions with better schooling facilities and higher literacy rates. This will be at the expense of people living in remote and risky areas, such as our borders, mountainous regions, etc. This will increase regional imbalances and increase separatist tendencies and strengthen separatist movements as in Pakistan. Military recruitment from Punjab is at the expense of other sub-nationals.
Another key feature that has been noticed is the excellent quality standards of the recruits. However, this is doubtful because all qualitative requirements according to age, qualification, educational, medical and physical criteria remain the same with only a few minor changes. Combat units work as a team, and are commanded by NCOs / JCOs / officers who are older and whose physical standards do not match the young soldiers they give. This always happens and is considered in all planning parameters.
On the one hand, if we want to recruit young people, we want them to be technically proficient. How can this dilemma be called? How is the recruitment of those who have just completed high school consistent with the required high technical skills? Being proficient in mobile usage is not a measure of technical skill. In addition, additional 1-2 years of advanced training is required for personnel in special units such as Special Forces, Armored, Artillery and Engineers, and for personnel operating crew-serviced weapons systems such as tanks, guns and missiles. As long as the firefighter qualifies to serve in one of these units, it will be time for them to leave, which is a waste of time, resources and funds.
A four-year service limit for firefighters is not feasible and will result in optimal performance. It is unrealistic to suggest that the inclusion of a limited number of firefighters will not have any adverse operational effects. The adverse effect on the unit's capacity as the number of units increased by the end of this decade and became 50 percent of the unit's strength can be measured by the total incompetence shown by Russian forces in Ukraine as it tries to occupy that country with troops. Which are either recruited or on a limited contract.
On the one hand, if we want to recruit young people, we want them to be technically proficient. How can this dilemma be called? How is the recruitment of those who have just completed high school consistent with the required high technical skills? Being proficient in mobile usage is not a measure of technical skill.
The "All India, All Class" (AIAC) recruitment system will have an effect on the regimental system which is prevalent in combat weapons, mainly infantry. The infantry is the backbone of our army and these are mainly 'single class regiments'. His performance over the centuries has been outstanding and he is respected around the world for his professionalism. The regimental system is the legacy of the colonies, and even if water is blocked, it cannot be done overnight. Cultural relations and traditions play an extremely important role in the military and no matter how laudable the objective, it cannot go free.
With recruitment halted for the last three years, and 50,000-60,000 personnel retiring below the rank of officer (PBOR) every year, the shortage in the Army is about 1.5 lakh. The new recruitment policy with about 40,000 odd vacancies in the military suggests that in addition to the previous shortfall, we will have an annual shortage of another 10,000-15,000 PBOR. This suggests that combat units are 25 per cent less than their official capacity, in addition to the 10 per cent personnel who are considered unfit for temporary duty, which has a major impact on the operational capacity of a unit, even more so, for those stationed in the mountains.
Boots on bots
It must be acknowledged that politicians, bureaucrats and policymakers are agreeing in the community that the size of our military is not sustainable. Given the geopolitical situation in the region, the types of threats facing us, and the changing nature of the war, existing capabilities have become increasingly irrelevant. Defence spending is also unlikely to increase, and with much of it going to meet revenue expenditures, there is very little left for capital expenditures, including modernisation
The military leadership, while aware of the issues involved, is reluctant to initiate concrete changes that affect the status quo. Some of this is due to his conservative mentality, his traditional approach to war, and his reluctance to change, but to be honest, most analysts suggest that the United States had to pull out of Afghanistan and Iraq because of the lack of boots on the ground. Russia is facing similar challenges in Ukraine.
In addition, in order to focus on operations in high-altitude mountains, you need to rely more on manpower than on technology, as technology has serious limitations in such extreme terrain. Moreover, on the disputed border, it is difficult to regain once lost land, so linear deployments and more troops are needed.
While it is necessary to authorize the military, the question of cuts in the Ministry of Defense and the establishment, which amounts to another 500,000 civilians, is under discussion for obvious reasons. For military authorization, there are a number of options available, such as the mechanization of all troops stationed on our western frontier, which will reduce manpower by increasing reliance on technology. Another option is to increase the number of your regional troops. Since it is only for regular annual training and run by volunteers when needed and part-time, the cost of pensions and salaries will be reduced.
However, the best option is to follow up on the 33rd report of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defense, which suggested the transfer of military personnel to the CAPF on completion of seven years of service. It has also been recommended by the Kargil Review Committee, a group of ministers reviewing the national security system and the Fifth and Sixth Central Pay Commissions. However, the CAPF has refused to accept side-by-side transfers on the grounds that it would affect their own cadre promotion prospects. Properly reconstructed agneepath scheme can be considered on this basis, otherwise, it may create more problems than it claims to solve.
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